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Abstract
This study applies the theories of technological innovation to
the process of formation and growth of biomedical and
pharmaceutical firms. It is based on detailed data gathered
from 26 firms, founded between 1968 and 1975 in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. These data were supplemented by
a three-member expert panel evaluation of the risk associated
with use of each firm's products.
A positive relationship was established between the level of
technological sophistication of the firm and the risk
associated with use of its products. Consequently,
technological advancement of the firm has not necessarily
resulted in high economic performance, in part because of the
high demands put upon the firm's resources and time by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration approval process.
The study indicates that the initial financial inputs have a
threshold effect on subsequent economic performance of
biomedical and pharmaceutical new firms. In the sample studied,
unless these inputs reached the $850,000 to $1,000,000 mark (in
1970-1975 dollars), technological innovation was negatively
mediated by the risk associated with the use of firm's products
and by the FDA quality control procedures. Consequently,
attempts at technological innovativeness are unfortunately
detrimental to economic performance of new and underfinanced
firms in the biomedical and pharmaceutical industry.
The research reported in this paper was in part supported by a
grant from the Kaiser Family Foundation to the MIT Whitaker
College Program in Health Policy and Management, and by funds
from the RCA Corporation in support of the MIT David Sarnoff
Professorship in the Management of Technology.
2 Our gratitude goes to Professor Stan Finkelstein of MIT and to
the entrepreneurs who shared their experience and insights with
us.
2Technology, Risk Associated with Use, and the FDA
The literature of technical entrepreneurship points to the
importance of the main resources of a new technical enterprise -
technological know-how and financial resources (Roberts, 1968;
Pankiewitz, 1980; Taylor, 1981; Utterback et al., 1983; Van de Ven et
al., 1983).
Recent work by Roberts et al. (1981) attempt to extrapolate
from the research base of non-biomedical industries to set a
structured research agenda for the biomedical field. The conceptual
model (Figure 1) presented by Moskowitz et al. (1981: 3-5) articulates
the progression of technology from ideas to products and practices,
and the interactions among people which facilitates this flow. These
processes operate in a specific regulatory and marketing environment,
which determines to great extent their structure, direction and
intensity.
Figure 1 approximately here
A related research perspective is based on the theories of
technological innovation and their diffusion. The classical opus in
this area by Coleman, Katz & Menzel (1966) exemplifies this approach.
More recent studies by Bernstein, Beaven, Kimberley, and Moch (1975),
and Leonard-Barton (1983) use similar premises and empirically
validate the paradigm of diffusion of medical innovations as a
two-stage communication process. Related studies focus on the relation
between basic research and its application in medical practice (Comroe
and Dripps, 1977). The Committee on Technology and Health Care of the
National Academy of Science (1979) provided rich conceptual background
3for the analysis of equipment-embodied medical technologies though
most of the theoretical analysis is based on cursory empirical data.
The extensive regulatory constraints imposed by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) emerge as one of the most significant
differences of the biomedical industry vis-a-vis other
technology-based industries. The extent of this external interference
and control of quality standards is overwhelming, including both the
efficacy and the safety of the product (pars. 510-515, FDA, 1976). The
regulations also include directions about manufacturing and
record-keeping procedures (par. 501), and labeling and advertising
standards (par. 502). Both sets of standards are far more rigorous
than standards which apply to nonbiomedical industries. The structure
of FDA regulations partitions the product areas of the biomedical
industry into drugs and pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and
paramedical products and supplies. The latter two categories were
first regulated by Congressional action in 1976.
Ashford, Butler and Zolt (1977), Young (1982), and Wardell (as
cited in Roberts, 1981) analyzed the pharmaceutical industry and the
influence of the FDA on its productivity and innovativeness. Another
direction followed by Fuchs (1974), Measday (1977), and Temin (1979)
focused on the changes in the pharmaceutical industry, historically
analyzing the interaction between technology and the regulatory
environment. Temin's study focused more on the economics of this
industry. More recently Birnbaum (1984) assessed the strategic
responses of firms in the X-ray equipment manufacturing industry to
increasing regulation. These studies present strong evidence for the
significance of the interplay between the regulatory constraints, and
the innovativeness in this industry.
4Wardell (1974) points to the fact that extensive regulations in
the U.S. decreased research productivity as measured by the number of
new chemical entities (NCE) presented to the FDA for approval. He also
showed (as cited in Young, 1982) that between 1962 and 1971 Britain
led with respect to drugs available in both nations, calculated in
terms of drug-years of prior availability. Britain also "..possessed
nearly four times as many exclusively available drugs as did the
United States" (Young, 1982, p. 19), mainly because the regulatory
constraints there have not been as severe as in the US. Moreover,
"This over-regulation had increased drug industry costs, driven a
great deal of research overseas or into safer generic areas, slowed or
blocked the release of useful drugs"[our emphasis]. The amendment to
the FDA Act in 1962 is described by Young (p.19) as "therapeutic
disaster". Ashford et al. (1977) voice the same sentiments with some
reservation related to the complexity of cost-benefit analysis of the
impact of the FDA regulations.
Recently, Finkelstein and Homer (1984) directly addressed the
issues of FDA policy decision-making in the face of the trade-off
between the public benefits from novel medical technologies, and the
higher risks associated with their use. They show how sensitively a
new medical technology's utilization might be influenced by government
regulations. Their computer-simulated comparison between the regulated
and the unregulated environment encountered by a new implantable heart
pacemaker technology shows that heavier regulations might delay the
product's technical evolution by as much as one and a half years, and
somewhat inhibit its sales growth during the first 12 ('.) years after
the new technology is introduced.
All these suggest that technological attributes of medical in-
novations are associated with the extent of FDA influence on their
development; this relation is obviously mediated by the risk
associated with the use (RAWU) of the product which embodies the
technological attributes. On the other hand, the intensity of the
FDA's regulatory constraints is a strong determinant of the time and
costs resulting from the federal approval process. Consequently, the
financial requirements for founding a biomedical firm must go beyond
the normal requirements of a new technology-based start-up, in order
to weather potentially prolonged periods of commercial inactivity
caused by the rigor of the FDA evaluation process.
The small and comparatively young biomedical firm, founded by
an entrepreneurial individual or group, with the explicit objective of
commercializing a product or technological knowhow, is the junction of
numerous processes. It contains all the stages of biomedical
innovation, from idea generation through to its communication,
utilization and development, and up to its diffusion into practice.
Determinants of Success and Failure of New Biomedical Firms: Research
Questions and Hypothese
The estimated volume of the U.S. biomedical and pharmaceutical
industry is quite significant, approximately 25 billion dollars in
1980 (Gibson et al., 1983; Frost and Sullivan, 1983). Yet no research
documents the role or issues of the young firm within this industry.
The research questions addressed in this paper stem directly from the
studies of the pharmaceutical industry and its innovations, and the
gaps in the ad hoc research pertaining to that industry: a) What is
the interaction between technological sophistication of a young
biomedical firm's products and the financial resources at its founding
6in determining its economic success? b) To what extent do the FDA
regulations impact technologically novel biomedical products and the
firms that generate them?
Our main hypothesis is that the interaction between the
technological innovativeness of a biomedical firm and the scale of its
financial resources in determining its economic success is somewhat
complex. The logical steps in modelling this process are threefold:
Because:
H: Technologically novel biomedical products, especially those
featuring new or first-of-a-kind technologies, or having
special specifications, generate higher perceived risk
associated with their use;
Then:
H2: The impact of FDA regulations is more significant for
technologically novel biomedical products;
Consequently:
H3: Only those firms which mobilize adequate financial resources
are able to benefit economically from their technological
innovativeness. Inversely, the attempts of inadequately
financed firms to launch technologically novel products are
detrimental to their economic peformance.
Sample Selection and Data Collection
The sampling procedure used in this study differs to some
extent from those used in prior studies of new firms (e.g., Roberts,
1968; Taylor, 1982; Utterback et al., 1983; Meyer and Roberts, 1984).
Although our sample was clearly purposive, we attempted to make it as
complete as possible.
7Our assumption was that the data pertinent to our hypotheses
would be available from firms with several specific attributes. First,
the firms should be approximately one decade old, to allow sufficient
time since incorporation so that their commercial performance is of a
more stable pattern, after the initial start-up turmoil. On the other
hand, to facilitate collection of first-hand data directly from the
founders, the firms should not be older than 15-20 years, which age
would increase the probability of founders' death or relocation, or of
change of ownership since incorporation.
Second, the firms should have been formed for the purpose of
doing business in the biomedical or the pharmaceutical industry, to
present a more focused picture about young company operations in this
specific area. Multi-product conglomerates clearly do not fit this
requirement.
Third, to present as much as possible a comprehensive picture
of the biomedical industry, the firms should be vertically integrated
from R&D to marketing. Consequently, the firm should be an independent
legal entity, not an R&D, manufacturing, or marketing arm of a larger
corporation.
Adhering to the above criteria, the process of sample selection
and data collection consisted of several stages. First, corporations
whose names suggested either a medical, pharmaceutical, biological, or
a general technical context were selected from the 1970 to 1975
Massachusetts State House incorporation records. Next, those firms
which either did not have the required vertical integration, were
previously incorporated outside Massachusetts, or did not actually
operate in the biomedical or the pharmaceutical industry were screened
out on the basis of direct review of their original records of
8incorporation in the State House registry.
Second, the founders of the relevant firms, including those
which had been dissolved, were located, to the extent possible.
Third, the research questionnaire was tested with the target
population, modified from earlier work used by Roberts and Wainer
(1971), Taylor (1981), and Utterback et al. (1982). The main factors
that were tested were the time required to complete the expanded
questionnaire and the relevance and clarity of the new questions
related to the medical context. The final research instruments
consisted of a self-administered questionnaire, containing mainly
well-structured and simple questions, and an interview questionnaire,
containing unstructured or complicated issues which required real-time
clarifications or explanations.
Fourth, founders' agreements to participate were secured. Among
those who were not willing to participate at this stage the common
explanation was "Don't want to talk". As much as the specific causes
could be traced, they were usually "preoccupation with the current
problems of the firm", or "the experience was too painful to walk
through it again for research purposes".
Fifth, the self-administered questionnaire was mailed to 32
founders of biomedical firms (in addition to the pilot study) of which
another 7 dropped out for various reasons. Some of the reasons that
were mentioned: "I'm too busy with my clinical research in X
University"; "The firm does not exist anymore"; "The questionnaire is
too long"; "He does not have the time, and he doesn't want to talk"
(secretary); "Although I'm willing to participate, I'm leaving for
business negotiations to Europe till the end of March".
Sixth, field interviews with 25 founders were conducted,
9usually in their office. The founders of firms that were dissolved
were interviewed at their homes or at the offices of their present
employer.
Seventh, in addition to the data about the risk associated with
use of their products that was collected directly from the
entrepreneurs, we decided, due to the potential importance of this
variable for causal analysis, to independently assess product risk by
use of external experts.
Sample Evaluation
Three firms were screened out of the sample, two of them due to
confounded background or inadequate data and another because it had
actually been incorporated in the early sixties.
For the analysis of entrepreneurial background and the initial
period of founding the firm, 28 cases were used, while for the
detailed causal analysis, 26 cases were included. One of the 26 cases
lacked data about entrepreneurial background, early founding, and
financing.
The final sample included three firms from the pre-test, for
which the data were collected in a slightly different format. Two
firms that were actually incorporated in 1968 and 1969 were included
in the sample, as representative of the agglomerates of firms founded
by the same founders between 1965 and 1975.
It was not possible in all the cases to obtain the necessary
information about the comparative performance or the product area of
the firms which dropped out of our sample. As far as we can tell
attrition biases are not significant. We know that at least one
dropped-out firm has approximately 400 employees, and another is a
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successful producer of heart pacemakers. Two firms were active in the
product area of drugs and pharmaceuticals and at least two were in
auxiliary products.
We assume the attrition of firms which were dissolved, or
encountered severe operational difficulties, was comparatively high.
At least one firm was under FDA investigation and could not
participate in the study for legal reasons. Drugs
were represented among the "drop-outs" (about 4-5
distinction between medical devices and auxiliary
the limited data in the State House objectives of
more difficult to make.
Other reasons for attrition included firms
large conglomerates or relocated to other regions
and pharmaceuticals
firms), but the
products, based on
incorporation, was
being acquired by
of the U.S. For
instance one firm had been undergoing acquisition by a Texas
corporation, two relocated to Florida and California, and two founders
had just recently died (see summary in Appendix A).
On the other hand, we would contend that the firms included in
the sample are representative of the population of medical instruments
firms, as described by Dorfman (1982) and by Hekman (1980). As also
can be seen from the above anecdotal information about the reasons for
self-elimination from the study, the firms that were excluded were of
a broad range of sizes and of economic performances (see Appendix B
for sample attributes). The breakdown by year of incorporation of the
sample selection and the data collection stages is summarized in Table
1.
Table 1 approximately here
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Indicators and Measures
Technological attributes of the firm
The various technological attributes of each firm's products
were evaluated by the entrepreneurs on quasi-Likert ordinal scales.
The aggregate indices of technological sophistication of a firm's
products were computed by summing up (across products) the scores on
the scales of the importance of "new technology or first of kind",
"special purpose or special specifications", and "calibre of product
or personnel" as competitive advantages of a firm's products. The
reliability of the additive indices based on the above three measures
for each of the products of the firms was sufficiently high to justify
their use as a measure of a single construct. (Cronbach's alpha
between 0.53 and 0.57 .)
To derive the product specific technological index the above
three scales were aggregated for each product separately (the alphas
for the three products ranged between 0.50 and 0.60). The index of
overall technological sophistication of the firm was derived by
summing up the product specific indices and was found to be highly
reliable (alpha=0.70).
Assessment of risk associated with use (RAWU)
The use of a panel of experts has been recommended for asses-
sment of risk associated with use of novel technologies (Fischhoff,
* For detailed discussion see:
Miller, D. C. (1983). Handbook of research design and social
measurement (4th edition). Longman, NY & London; Novick. M. R., &
Lewis, C. (1967). Coefficient alpha and the reliability of composite
measurements. Psychometrika, 32, 1-13.
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Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1982). The size of the panel
(three members) corresponds to the recommendations of Libby and
Blashfield (1978) and Rohbaugh (1979), who showed that increasing the
size of the panel beyond three members offers only incremental
improvements in reliability.
Our panel comprised three MDs in the early stages of their
professional careers, who, independently of each other, estimated the
risk associated with use of each firm's products. The dimensions that
were evaluated by the panel included risk to the medical personnel and
to patients associated with use of the products, the invasiveness of
the products, and the products' proximity to the clinical high impact
area of the industry.
The panel supplied its assessment of the RAWU as scores on
quasi-Likert ordinal scales. The raw scores of the panel were
aggregated consecutively on three levels: a)for an additive scale of
the three panel members, which yielded a Cronbach alpha of 0.91; b)for
an additive scale of the scores on "Risk associated with use to the
patient" and the "Invasiveness" for each product, which yielded
Cronbach's alphas between 0.92 and 0.96; and c)for the overall risk
associated with use index of the firm, derived by summing up the
product specific indices, which yielded a Cronbach alpha of 0.98.
Starting from the second level of aggregation of the raw scores RAWU
the resulting indices were treated as interval variables. (See
Appendix C for descriptive statistics of the RAWU.)
The impact of the FDA regulations
The impact of the FDA regulations on firm's operations was
estimated by two independent indicators: a)the reported impact of the
13
FDA regulations on firm's operations and management decision-making,
and b)the estimate of the out-of-pocket expenses precipitated by the
requirements of the FDA interactions.
Measurement of economic success
The evaluation of economic success is an interesting issue;
several studies in the past used quite simple indicators of commercial
success of new firms. Meyer and Roberts (1984) argue that growth rate
of sales alone is not reliable because it is biased towards the fast
growing young firms. They divided the growth in sales by the age of
the firm, using an aggregate of the last two years to smooth for
annual fluctuations.
Taylor (1981, 15-16) used growth rates of sales as a measure of
economic performance, although he partitioned his sample into
"relatively successful" firms, "..if [they have] average sales growth
that places [them] in the top half of the sample, and if [they have]
been profitable in at least two of the past three years" (p. 15), and
"relatively unsuccessful" if they have not. It should be noted,
though, that Taylor's sample has a wide distribution of the start-up
year: from 1960 to 1981. This factor presents acute problems of
control for his study, especially for causal analysis. The Meyer and
Roberts sample spans eight years of corporate birthdates (1968-1976),
compared with six years span for most of the firms in the sample used
in the present study.
The significance of firm's age as a determinant of its sales
was tested and the results could not reject the null hypothesis of no
difference. On the other hand, to smooth temporary fluctuations of
sales, we used the average of the annual sales between 1980 and 1983
14
as the indicator of firm's commercial success. This index was highly
correlated with the 1983 market value of the firm, as estimated by the
entrepreneur (R=0.92), with the average number of firm's employees for
the same four years (R=0.95), and with the growth in annual sales
(R=0.95), validating its possible use as a single measure of firm's
success.
Results
Technology and risk associated with use
The first in our chain of hypotheses was that technologically
novel products will be concomitantly of high risk associated with
their use. According to our findings (Table 2), the strongest
indicator of technological novelty of firm's products - "new
technology or first of a kind" is positively associated with the RAWU
Table 2 approximately here
score of each firm's products. On the other hand, the average novelty
of a firm's product specifications or purpose, and the calibre of
firm's products or personnel, do not contribute to higher risk
associated with their use. This finding, in addition to proving the
main point of technological newness-RAWU association, also suggests a
less "painful" alternative way for biomedical technological innovation
- special specifications or special purpose, and not new technology or
first of a kind. In contrast, the calibre of product or personnel is a
passive descriptive concept, which does not imply a specific technolo-
15
gical innovation strategy.
The impact of the FDA regulations
Before we address our second hypothesis, dealing with the
causal relations between technology, risk associated with product use,
and the impact of the FDA regulations, it is important to understand
the various dimensions of the FDA requirements which bear upon the
biomedical firm.
Sixty five percent of the products of the firms in our sample
were regulated by the Bureau of Medical Devices of the FDA and 27% by
either the Bureau of Drugs or Biologicals. Only two firms considered
themselves not regulated at all, either because they had launched
their products (medical devices or auxiliary products) before those
categories were included in the FDA regulations, or because their
products were quite removed from the clinical and consequently the
regulated core of the industry.
The entrepreneurs reported that the FDA regulations influenced
their product strategies on the average 3.2 points on a 5-point scale
(64%), and their impact on the firm in general, as measured by the
number of operational issues impacted by the regulations, 2.8 points
on a similar 5-point scale (56%). Forty two percent reported that the
regulations were prone to inconsistent interpretations of the FDA
examiners, and 19% claimed that their products had actually been mis-
classified by these examiners into wrong categories, probably due to
insufficient FDA professional understanding.
The medical devices and auxiliary products in our sample were
mostly of FDA classes I and II (86%), which require nonclinical proof
of safety and efficacy, while 14% were of class III, requiring
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clinical tests. The former products were usually approved in the frame
of paragraph 510K of the 1976 amendment, which is known in the
industrial jargon as the "510K form". Those firms had to wait on the
average between 45 and 90 days for "approval from Washington", though
for most of the firms (62%) the process did not take more than 45
days. The approval process for class I and II products usually did not
require more than one additional iteration, initiated usually by the
FDA examiners due to some missing data, product misclassification or
simply lost correspondence.
The climate for pharmaceutical and biological products is much
more restrictive. Approval of an investigational new drug (IND)
application for preliminary tests of efficacy takes between two and
five years. The premarketing approval of a new drug application (NDA)
has been of similar magnitude, resulting together with the IND in 6 to
10 years of iterative testing and application.
The sampled firms' reported out-of-pocket expenses for external
consultants, costs of clinical tests, special facilities or labeling
procedures and other similar costs, range from none to $120,000 per
annum, with a $30,000 median. We assume that neither figure includes
lost revenues caused by the delays, nor the time spent by the
founders.
It is interesting to know whether the intervention by the
federal authorities has been warranted by real issues of safety and
efficacy of the products. Although our data do not address the
cost-benefit analysis of government regulations, we tested whether
products which were evaluated by the experts panel as having high RAWU
drew more "fire" from the FDA . The data presented in Table 3 support
the overall validity of at least the direction if not the intensity
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Table 3 approximately here
of the FDA intervention. The correlations between RAWU and the impact
of the FDA regulations on the firm, especially as measured by the
overall RAWU of its products, are statistically significant. It seems
logical that the impact of first product's RAWU was the most
significant: launching a product of high risk associated with its use
can be a quite critical event for a young firm. The increasing
correlations between the FDA-precipitated expenses and the RAWU of
products 2 and 3 is more difficult to explain. We hypothesize that
most of the FDA expenses related to the first product were perceived
by the interviewed entrepreneurs as founding expenses, while the
expenses related to the second and third products were perceived as
operational, and were reported as such.
The Financial Threshold Effect
The general financial attributes of biomedical firms are
comparable to other technology-based enterprises (Table 4). For
instance, Taylor (1981) reported an average of $67,000 in initial
equity and 48,000 in loans, totaling $115,000 in initial capital of
his industrial "spin-off" firms that were founded between 1960 and
1981. In our sample the co-founders and their families provided
approximately 62% of initial capital base, with venture capitalists
and banks playing quite a minor role at this initial stage. The
subsequent resource mobilization was more substantial, with an average
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of more than a million dollars in long-term capital, accompanied of
course by gradual shifting of equity control of the firm away from
its initial founders. External ownership increased from 10% to 23% on
the average from founding till 1983, with at least five firms having
been acquired by larger biomedical firms or by conglomerates.
Table 4 approximately here
At this stage of analysis the presence of financial outliers in
the sample must be treated. Two firms, which incidentally have both
recently been acquired, had extensive capital financing. These two
firms succeeded in mobilizing $850,000 and a million dollars in
initial financing, and their later public offerings generated
additional $9.2 and $6.4 million dollars in equity, respectively.
Their economic performances have been accordingly outstanding, with
$30 and $9 million sales in 1983, averaging $24.4 and $7.2 million in
annual sales between 1980 and 1983, respectively. In comparison, the
total sample's annual sales mean (Table 5) for the same period was
about $2.5 million (for the 22 enterprises which still independently
existed in 1983). These 22 firms generated $55 million in sales in
1983, and about 1100 in employment, with the two outliers contributing
approximately 60% to these figures. This concentration of success is
not unlike the relative role of Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC)
among the 50 firms that had emerged from MIT's Lincoln Laboratory (see
Roberts, 1968).
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Table 5 approximately here
This information is useful for statistical testing of the
causal relation between a firm's financial inputs and its economic
performance. Clearly the presence of outliers distorts this relation:
the positive Pearson's correlation between the total initial capital
and average sales between 1980 and 1983 of R=0.49, decreases to
statistically insignificant R=0.10 when the outliers are excluded.
The second hypothesized determinant of a firm's economic
performance is its technological innovativeness, as measured by the
technological sophistication of the firm's products. We found that the
associations between the indicators of technological innovativeness of
the firm's products and its average annual sales are somewhat
ambiguous (Table 6): first, the start-up period presents an unstable
pattern, with correlations ranging from -0.16 to 0.32 for the first
three products of the firm, with R=-0.02 for the products' average.
Second, although the correlations between the technological indicators
and the annual sales between 1980-1983 are positive, they are still
not significant statistically.
Table 6 approximately here
In accord with our previous findings it was essential to test
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these relations for the influence of the two financial- performance
outliers. The results of this procedure are quite eloquent (Table 7):
the ambiguous positive relations between the indicators of
technological innovativeness and economic success become explicitly
and significantly negative for the 20 firms which could not mobilize
the necessary "threshold" financing attained by the two performance
outliers.
Table 7 approximately here
The concept of minimal "threshold" financing, below which the
net contribution of technological innovation to economic success
becomes highly dubious, gains some support from our previous findings
on the impact of the restrictive policies of the FDA. We should bear
in mind that FDA policy has been especially critical to those firms
which attempted to develop and market technologically novel products.
Putting it differently, unless the biomedical firm is adequately
financed at founding (which in this sample from the 1970-1975 context
meant between $850,000-1,000,000), its technological innovativeness
will be detrimental to its economic performance. The mediating role of
the risk associated with the use of firm's products, and the problems
posed by the FDA "quality assurance" procedure, seem quite plausibly
to be a severe externally imposed handicap on technologically
innovative firms.
The final step of causal analysis brings together the main
potential determinants of economic success of biomedical enterprises -
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the technological and the financial inputs, and the risk associated
with product use (RAWU), which negatively mediates between
technological innovation and economic performance. The variables are
selected to facilitate causal inferences; the causal relation between
mobilization of resources and economic performance might conceivably
be reversed because initial economic performance might increase a
firm's credibility, which can generate positive speculations about its
future, facilitating the mobilization of substantial external capital
through public or private offerings. In contrast with this
possibility, the initial capital explicitly precedes in time the
1980-1983 sales, consequently controlling for reversed causality.
Second, both the technological innovation and the RAWU measures are
based on products which had been launched mainly between 1970 and
1979, with only 29% of them entering the market between 1980 and 1983
Table 8 approximately here
(Table 8). The sequence of these events in time is graphically
described in Figure 2. The formation of the products' attributes
mostly took place
Figure 2 approximately here
in the mid-seventies and consequently cannot be the outcome of
economic performance of the firm between 1980 and 1983.
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The results of the regression analysis are indicative of the
same process, already elicited through the bivariate inferential
analysis. It seems from the regression that initial financing becomes
quite inconsequentially related to economic performance of an average
biomedical firm. On the other hand, the independent effect of
technological innovation on the firm's success is negative and
statistically significant; the role of the mediating RAWU is negative,
though clearly not significant.
Table 9 approximately here
This analysis suggests that significant technological
innovation in biomedical area should be undertaken only by those young
firms which succeed in securing not less than some significant
threshold level (here $850,000 to a million dollars) as initial
founding capital. Otherwise the requirements of the product evaluation
procedure, enforced by the FDA, will render these attempts at
technological innovation economically counterproductive.
Alternatively, young and potentially innovative biomedical firms might
seek to couple with the financial reources of larger corporations in
strategic alliances aimed at achieving mutual benefits.
Managerial Implications
This study contributes to further understanding of a uniquely
important feature of the medical field - that technical innovation is
a double-edged sword, unlike in the other areas of technology. Greater
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innovation in the biomedical area generally brings with it higher risk
associated with use of the medical products. In turn FDA regulatory
impact directly correlates with the extent of assessed innovation. The
implication is that unless the young company is particularly well
financed, the effect of FDA regulation is to prevent the innovative
firm from experiencing economic success in the marketplace.
The empirically revealed division in the sample of young
biomedical firms - that underfinanced companies languish when they
innovate and well-financed innovative companies succeed - provides an
interesting basis for possible ties between large and small companies
in the biomedical industry. Large and small companies have potentially
significant mutual benefits to gain from linkages such as sponsored
research and/or product development, venture capital investments by
the large in the small, and especially by creation and nurturing of
on-going strategic business alliances, perhaps including formal joint
ventures. This research has explicated the lack of adequate
capitalization of most innovative young biomedical companies, while it
has also evidenced their lack of experience with the FDA, and their
lack of appropriate and strong marketing channels. Larger medical
products firms have already managed to overcome these cited dimensions
of deficiency. But the young firms bring high levels of
entrepreneurial commitment and demonstrated high levels of
technological innovation, achievements that may be less attainable in
the larger corporation. Opportunities for complementary
co-relationships seem abundant.
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Table 1: Attrition of the initial sample during selection
and data collection
Year of incorporation 
Initial sample
Stage 2 selection
Mailing list of
questionnaires
Complete data
collected
Total
506
106
36
29
1970
65
13
5
5
1971
76
19
5
5
1972
66
20
Note: A 1974 incorporated firm had actually been
a 1975 incorporation had been started in 1969.
1973
92
13
7 2
71 21
founded in 1968, and
Table 2: RAWU and the technological dimensions of the firm
Technological
dimensions of
firm's products
Risk assoc;
First product
N 26
New technology
or first of kind 0.34
Special specifications
or special purpose 0.06
Calibre of product or
personnel -0.14
ated with
Second product
20
0.45
0.09
0.10
use of
Third product
16
0.33
0.06
-0.18
Pearson correlations: p=0.10; p=0.05. Positive correlations
indicate association of high RAWU and high score on the technological
dimensions.
1974
78
9
1975
129
32
6 9
5
5 5
........-
. .
-
.
. , u
E; ,s , . _^ .............. N _ _ _ . _ _ .. ,. , __ C. ..
l
i
I I
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Table 3: Impact of the FDA regulations and the risk
associated with use of firm's products
Risk associated
with use of firm's
products
First product
Second product
Third product
The firm (products average)
Overall impact
of FDA regulations
N R
26 0.35**
19 0.29
16 0.14
26 0.32*
Expenses for the
FDA interface
N R
19 0.20
15 0.32
**
13 0.51
19 0.47**
Spearman and Pearson correlations: p=0.10; p=0.05. Seven
entrepreneurs could not evaluate their FDA interface expenses.
Table 4: Financial profile of biomedical enterprises
Financial
parameters
of the firm (N)
Initial equity (25)
Initial loans (25)
Total initial
capital (25)
Subsequent long-
term capital (24)
RanRe
Minimum
($ 000)
O
0O
1
O
Maximum
($ 000)
850
450
1,000
9,200
Average
($ ooo000)
75
56
130
1,064
Excluding the firms that were dissolved, it averages $1161K.
-
.. _
----
w
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Table 5: Industrial and economic profile of biomedical firms
Industrial and
economic Darameters (N)
Founding - first 2 years (26)
Average annual sales ($000)
Number of employees
Proportion of exports(%)
1980 - 1983 (22)
Average annual sales ($000)
Number of employees
Proportion of exports(%)
R a n g e
Minimum
O
O0
0
0
1
0OOO
Maximum
918
37
10
24,410
483
30
Average
for all firms
158
6
1
2,490
50
6
Table 6: Technological innovation and economic performance of
the firm
Technological E c on o m i c P e r f o r m a n c e
Sophistication A n n u a 1 S a 1 e s Estimated Market Value
Indicators for (N) First 2 years 1980-83 ! 1977 1980 1983
First product (26)| -0.16 0.18 0.29* 0.26 0.25
Second product (20)1 0.28 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.24
Third product (16)| 0.32 0.27 0.35 0.37 0.30
The firm (pro- I
ducts' average) (26) -0.02 0.14 0.31 0.27* 0.24 
Pearson correlation: p=0.10; p=0.05.
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Table 7: Technological innovativeness and economic performance
Technological
innovativeness
of firm's
products
New technology or
first of kind
Special specifi-
cations or purpose
Calibre of pro-
duct or personnel
Average annual sales 1980-83
Excludin n
Dissolved
(N=22)
0.17
i 0.06
I-0.01
Dissolved and outliers
(N=20)
-0.47**
-0.44**
-0.60
Pearson correlations: p=0.10; p=0.05; p=0.01.
Table 8: Schedule of launching new products by biomedical
firms in the sample
Year of
market entry
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1983
Total
First
%
product
N
68 17
20 6
12 3
.100 26
Second
%
product
N
40 8
30 6
30 6
100 20
Third
L%
product
N
25 4
19 3
56 9
100 16
Total
%
products
N
47 29
24 15
29 18
100 62
.
--
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Figure 1: The biomedical research spectrum (Roberts et al.,
1981: 7)
Table 9: Multivariate regression: determinants of economic
performance of biomedical firms
Dependent variables
Independent
variables
Initial capital
Technological innova-
tiveness of the firm
Risk associated with
use of firm's products
R square
F
Average annual sales 1980 - 1983
E x c 1 u d i n g
Dissolved IDissolved and Outliers
BETA F BETA F
0.60 6.3 0.10 0.2
-0.15 0.5 t -0.60 7.7
-0.15 0.5 1 -0.12 0.3
0.28 0.36
2.18 i 2.75
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Figure 2: The time sequence of the variables in the causal
model of economic performance of biomedical firms
Third
Product
RAWU &
y Technology
'\
\ .,,~~~~~
\~~~~
198 190195 __ __180 18
----r"7
1975 - 1980 9831968 1970
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Appendix A: Sample attrition statistics (after stage 2)
Cause for
Attrition
Total set after
selection stage 2
1. Dental clinic
2. Not medical
3. Only marketing
4. Actually incorpo-
rated too early
Total
N
106
2
2
3
5
Y e a r o f I n c o r o r a t
1970
13
2
5. Not originally incorporated
in Massachusetts 1 
6. Do not want to
talk 16 2
7. No address or
contact 47 4
8. Founder dead 2 |
9. Inadequate data 2 1
Total attrition 80 | 9
1971
19
219
2
3
9
1
15
I
1972
20
1
2
10
1973
13
2
1
2
6
v v
1
i 
ii
14 11
5 _ t _
The final sample 126 l 4
1974
9
1
3
4.,.
i o n'
1975
32
2
2
6
15
1
27
_ __
-
-
__
l , I I I Ir( 4 : D : L. I D
I - __ __ __~~--
L
.
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Appendix B: Sample descriptive data
B-l: Business classification
Business
Definitio n
Marketing only
Manufacturing only
R&D and consulting
R&D and manufacturing
From R&D to marketing
Frequency
1968-1975
N
2 8
3 12
4 15
6 23
11 42
1980-1983
N
3 12
6 23
17 65
26 100 26 100
B-2: Product area
Product
Are a
Auxiliary products
Medical devices
Medical devices and
auxiliary products
Drugs/pharmaceuticals
Drugs/pharmaceuticals
and auxiliary products
Drugs/pharmaceuticals
and medical devices
Frequency
N %
6 23
10 38
4 15
3 12
2 8
4
N %
6 23
14 53
6 24
1 26 100
Total
- -- 1
._ ..
.
l
Total 26 100
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics of RAWU
D-1: Distribution statistics of RAWU raw scores
First Product
N 26
Second Product Third Product
20 16
Statistics PAT(*) INV(*) PAT INV PAT INV
Mean 13.4 14.7 12.8 14.2 14.7 15.1
Median 13.8 16.0 10.5 16.0 14.5 18.0
Std. Dev. 5.5 5.9 6.2 6.4 5.6 6.6
Skewness -0.3 -0.6 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8
* PAT = RAWU to the patient; INV = Invasiveness.
D-2: Distribution statistics of RAWU by products, and firm's average
First Product Second Product Third Product Firm
Statistics N 26 20 16 20
Mean 28.2 27.0 29.8 27.9
Median 28.5 28.5 32.5 28.1
Std. Dev. 11.0 12.3 12.1 10.1
Skewness -0.5 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4
-__I__-__
